Death Penalty

YoungStonewall wrote:Which ones apply and which ones don't?

Well for one thing, where do you get a basis for punishments, other than the OT? I think the ideas should be applied. If you steal, you pay back. If you murder, you pay back life with life. If you kill lawfully (abortion) you should still be killed, because it should be illegal.

About the confession. It seems clear to me from the confession's proof texts that it is talking about sacramental laws, and laws about not wearing

YoungStonewall wrote:You asked me "Do you agree with that part of the WCF?" The section you quoted from is from the original 1646 version, and was heavily modified by american presbyterians in 1787.

To answer your question, no I don't believe that section of the confession that you quoted is biblical., and it was removed by american presbyterians over two centuries ago.

Lets simplify our debate here. The nation of Israel had a unique status, they were both a sovereign nation, and the only visible church.

The purpose of this debate is to discuss the realm of civil justice, so lets seek to limit our discussion to the civil realm.

For the sake of discussion, let us assume for a moment that what you are saying is true, and you have the power to restore the civil code of Israel as the law of the land.

Please lay out for me how it would work.

Where are the Levite cities where accidental muderers can flee?

Where will should we build the new alter and its horns?

How many shekels should I sell my daughter for as a slave?

Would you buy her? Why/Why Not?

How many oxen and donkeys do you own?

What should we do during the year of Jubilee?

Why do you wear blended fabrics?

Why do you eat hybrid food?

I may have misled you in my early discussions. I believe that the general principles of the mosaic law apply today. No I don't believe that the year of jubilee applies the same today as in Israel's time, etc. I believe that the death penalties apply in principle.

2. WCF 19:3-5 clearly asserts a threefold division of the law

Second, WCF 19:3-5, clearly asserts a threefold division of the law following in the line of John Calvin and the church fathers, and contra Bahnsen.

It does so on the basis of inference from Scripture, taking into consideration both the nature of the laws themselves and the distinctive role of Israel in the redemptive economy. Moreover the WCF identifies the recipients of two of the three departments of law (ceremonial and judicial) as the people of Israel, while it extends the obligation of the moral law to all men. Accordingly, if Bahnsen is consistent in his criticism, the WCF must be classified as practicing "unwarranted compartmentalization" in its view of the law and therefore guilty of Bahnsen's charge of "latent antinomianism."24 It should be said that the WCF did not aim to say the final word on categories of the law of Moses or to rule out further discussion of the issue. But in regard to the issue of which laws are obligatory for New Covenant believers, its threefold division is definitive.

3. WCF 19:4 asserts that the judicial law has expired

Again, WCF 19:4 says that the judicial law has expired and is not binding ("obliging") on any nation-state now. It is entirely appropriate to ask two questions at this point. First, can a Theonomist really affirm that the civil law has "expired" and is "not obliging" any other nation-state now, and do justice to the plain sense, original intent and obvious emphasis of the statement? Second, if one were a Theonomist and writing a confession, is this how one would phrase a theonomic position which emphatically affirms the universally and perpetually binding character of the Mosaic civil code? The only rational answer to both these queries is an unequivocal "NO!" Bahnsen immediately counters, that in light of his interpretation of 23:3, "whatever 19.4 may mean, it cannot be understood as abrogating, say, the death penalty for blasphemers, and so forth."25 However, to interpret the confession in such a way that "general equity" cancels out the Assembly's declaration in the restrictive clause (which expired...) that modifies the direct object (sundry judicial laws) is to make a mockery of the English language. Indeed, Sinclair Ferguson comments:

it is difficult, to the point of impossibility—in this context in which the question of the continuation of the Mosaic judicial system had been long and heatedly discussed—to believe that the Westminster Divines would attempt to express a theonomic viewpoint by the wording we actually find in the Confession.26

The sentence structure of 19:4 yields a modern wording like this: "He [God] gave to them [the people of Israel] also, as a body politick, sundry judicial laws which expired together with the state of that people [Israel], not obliging any other [nation-state] now, further than the general equity thereof may require."27 To paraphrase and put in contemporary English: "God also gave to his people Israel, in their capacity as a nation-state, various civil laws. These laws terminated along with the extinction of the state of Israel and are not binding on any other nation-state now, further than the general equity (which lies behind them) may require."28

It is clear that there is no theonomic reading of WCF 19:4 which is capable of doing justice to its declaration of the judicial laws' termination. It may be asked in this context, what exactly the Divines meant by "further than the general equity may require?" This will be addressed shortly, but warrants one brief comment here. Undoubtedly, the WCF intended to allow for a broad range of opinion on the propriety of the application of various Mosaic judicial statutes in modern society.29 What it did not accommodate for, however, is the view that the judicials remain binding in principle.

5. WCF 19:4 meaning of "general equity" is at odds with theonomic interpretation.

Finally, as we have previously mentioned, Reconstructionists appeal to the phrase "further than the general equity thereof may require" as negating the force of the phrases "which expired" and "not obliging any other now." In that light, they interpret the statement as a whole as an indication that though the wording of the judicial law has expired, yet all its regulations and penology remain not only viable but obligatory for the modern nation-state. Now it goes without saying that this is a very dubious way of reading 19:4 indeed. Yet Bahnsen assures us:

The Puritans termed these case-law applications of the Decalogue "judicial laws," and they correctly held that we are not bound today to keep these judicial laws as they are worded (being couched in a language of an ancient culture that has passed away) but only required to heed their underlying principles (or "general equity," as they called it)[emphasis mine].32

Bahnsen's identification of "general equity" with "underlying principles" is accurate, but his implicit relegation of the concept to the wording of the laws is misleading and ahistorical. Calvin and his Puritan successors, to be sure, believed that there were underlying principles to be gleaned from the Mosaic civil code. But they also believed that not only the form but the content (including the penal sanctions) of the law could be altered by the modern legislator in the pursuit of an equitable law.33 In this light, Ferguson correctly remarks "that the theonomic interpretation of the principle of general equity is not identical with that adopted by the Puritan writers."34 At any rate, the theonomic exegesis of WCF 19:4 is hopeless since the preceding parts of the sentence are ignored and "general equity" is made to be the main thrust of the sentence's statement about the judicial law.

These five assertions make it quite clear that the Assembly was not committed in principle to the theonomic thesis. Of course, this was always very clear to the father of the Reconstructionist movement. Rushdoony himself, commenting on WCF 19:4, said: "...in paragraph IV, without any confirmation from Scripture, it is held that the `judicial laws' of the Bible `expired' with the Old Testament. ...At this point, the Confession is guilty of nonsense."35 Rushdoony seems to have managed an objectivity in his reckoning with the clear meaning of WCF 19:4 which has escaped most of the Presbyterian proponents of Theonomy.

The fact that the Confession does not assert a theonomic view of the role of the Mosiac law in current civil ethics, leaves us with two options in determining the relationship of the theonomic theory and the view presented in the Westminster Confession. Theonomy is either extra-confessional or anti-confessional. That is, Theonomy is either not addressed by the Westminster Confession (and hence, neither affirmed nor condemned by it) or is contradictory of the teaching of the Confession.

The case for it being extra-confessional has sometimes been made, but fails for the following reason. The Theonomist (because of his view that the civil law of God is universally and perpetually obligatory, the promotion of which is part of sanctification) must consider fellow ministers, who are in hearty agreement with the Confession's teaching on the law, to be latent antinomians at best. This indicates that the confessional position is, in fact, at odds with Theonomy. Which brings us to other option.

Reflection on this matter will show that Reconstructionism's view of the continuing obligation to the civil law is antithetical (rather than supplemental) to the Confession's view of the law. No man can unreservedly subscribe to the Westminster Confession (or the Second London Confession of 1689 [a Particular Baptist creed]) and hold a Reconstructionist view of the law, because the Reconstructionist position on the continuing normativity of the civil law on priniciple (cf. Bahnsen, By This Standard, 301) postivel y contradicts the WCF in at least four points: 1) the threefold division of the law, 2) the assertion that the civil law has expired, 3) the recognition of ad hoc principles in the civil law, and 4) in its definition of "general equity." Thus, if the Reconstructionists are right in their view, the Confession must of necessity be declared antinomian in its view of God's law. This alone ought to make clear the fact that Theonomy is not extra-confessional, but anti-confessional.

So I believe you are wrong....and I'm not mistaken.

meant in harmless banter, a jocular comment perhaps

YoungStonewall wrote:

So I believe you are wrong....and I'm not mistaken.

This illustrates something very disturbing trend that I have noticed about those that hold to a theonomic view. They argue their position with a supreme arrogance, without a shred of christian charity or love.

I fear Bahnsen would weep if he could see your attitude. I have heard him debate and he always did so with compassion and charity, NEVER with a "I'm right, your wrong, So there!" attitude.

YoungStonewall wrote:Before we can continue we need to clarify one point.

I believe in the three fold division of the law. The Moral, the Ceremonial, and the Judicial.

As the confession clearly states the Moral is still binding, the Judicial expired with the end of the nation of Israel, and the Ceremonial was abrogated with the coming of Christ.

What is your view?

Legolas Greenleaf wrote:

YoungStonewall wrote:Before we can continue we need to clarify one point.

I believe in the three fold division of the law. The Moral, the Ceremonial, and the Judicial.

As the confession clearly states the Moral is still binding, the Judicial expired with the end of the nation of Israel, and the Ceremonial was abrogated with the coming of Christ.

What is your view?

My view is that the Moral law is still binding today. I.E. the 10 commandments.

I believe that the Judicial law is binding today in principle. I believe that as specifics the laws applied only to Israel. However as principles they are binding upon all nations. Sorting out how those principles apply is another matter.....

The Ceremonial law was pointing to Christ and fulfilled and done away with in Christ's death.